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Abstract: Web tracking companies use device fingerprinting to distinguish the users of the web-
sites by checking the numerous properties of their machines and web browsers. One way to protect
the users’ privacy is to make them switch between different machine and browser configurations.
We propose a formalization of this privacy enforcement mechanism. We use information-theoretic
channels to model the knowledge of the tracker and the fingerprinting program, and show how to
synthesise a randomisation mechanism that defines the distribution of configurations for each user.
This mechanism provides a strong guarantee of privacy (the probability of identifying the user is
bounded by a given threshold) while maximising usability (the user switches to other configura-
tions rarely). To find an optimal solution, we express the enforcement problem of randomization
by a linear program. We investigate and compare several approaches to randomization and find
that more efficient privacy enforcement would often provide lower usability. Finally, we relax
the requirement of knowing the fingerprinting program in advance, by proposing a randomisation
mechanism that guarantees privacy for an arbitrary program.
Key-words: privacy enforcement, web tracking countermeasure, quantitative information flow
Assurer l’anonymat dans un navigateur Web par
quantification des flots d’information
Résumé : Pour traquer les utilisateurs de site web, certaines entreprises utilisent une technique
basée sur la prise d’empreintes. Celle-ci consiste à distinguer les utilisateurs en collectant de
nombreuses caractéristiques de leur machine ou navigateur. Intuitivement, il est possible de se
protéger contre la prise d’empreinte en changeant régulièrement de machine ou de configuration
de navigateur. Nous proposons une formalisation de système de protection de la vie privée. Nous
utilisons la notion de canal (channel) pour modéliser à la fois la connaissance de l’attaquant et
le programme de prise d’empreinte. À partir de ce modèle, nous montrons comment randomiser
la distribution des utilisateurs. Nous apportons une forte garantie quant au respect de la vie
privée (la probabilité d’identifier un utilisateur est bornée par un seuil donné) tout en maximisant
l’ergonomie (l’utilisateur change de configuration aussi rarement que possible). Pour synthéthiser
une randomisation optimale, nous exprimons le problème comme un program linéaire. Nous
avons examiné différentes approches pour randomiser et nous avons constaté que les algorithmes
les plus efficaces sont responsables d’une moindre ergonomie. Finalement, nous proposons un
mécanisme de randomisation qui garantis l’anomymat pour un programme arbitraire.
Mots-clés : privacy enforcement, web tracking countermeasure, quantitative information flow
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name p(name)
Firefox 0.49
Chrome 0.49
Opera 0.02
1 if (name = "Opera")
2 then o := A;
3 else o := B;
4 output o;
Figure 1: A priori distribution of names and a program P1.
1 Introduction
Web tracking companies are actively using device fingerprinting to identify the users of the web-
sites by checking the numerous properties of their machines and web browsers. While this tech-
nique is of great value to trackers, it clearly violates users privacy. The Panopticlick project [12]
was the first to demonstrate the power of fingerprinting, while recent research shows that this
technique is widely used by web tracking companies [1, 22].
Today, only few solutions exist for protecting the users from being fingerprinted. Acar et
al. [1] have analysed these solutions and concluded that none of them can guarantee user privacy.
For example, the Firegloves [4] browser extension returns randomized values when queried for
certain browser attributes. However since the same attributes can be accessed via different
browser APIs, the users of Firegloves become more uniquely identifiable than users who do not
install this extension. Nevertheless, the idea of such randomisation is a promising approach
to counter fingerprinting but its foundations should be developed further. In this paper, we
propose a theory of privacy enforcement by randomisation and show what privacy guarantee can
be achieved. From this theory, we derive an enforcement mechanism for obtaining this guarantee.
Fingerprinting is based on the fact that the user identity strongly relates to its browser
properties, over which a script operates while collecting this data. A standard way to define
how much information is leaked from a secret input to the program to the observable output, is
by quantitative information flow (QIF) definitions of information leakage. We present a simple
example of a possibly fingerprinting program and try to apply well-known QIF definitions of
information leakage to discover what privacy guarantee we can obtain.
Example 1. For a simple illustration, consider the distribution of the browser names and the
potentially fingerprinting program P1 from Fig. 1. The distribution of browser names is known to
the tracker and is called an a priori distribution. Assuming there are 50 visitors to the website,
only one will have an Opera browser, and hence will be uniquely identified by executing the
program. Notice that other 49 visitors are indistinguishable since the execution of the program
will yield an output o = B for all of them.
1.1 QIF definitions as a measure of anonymity
To compute how much information a tracker learns about the user’s browser by executing the
program, we can use the standard definitions of quantitative information flow (i.e., Shannon
entropy, min-entropy, guessing entropy, etc.) and compute an information leakage averaged
for all possible outputs represented by a number of bits. Here we propose to compare related
definitions based on the probability of learning the program secret input.
QIF definitions are based on the fact that a program output transforms an a priori distribution
of secrets into an a posteriori distribution of secrets given an observed output. In Fig. 2 we
show two a posteriori distributions that represent the knowledge of the tracker corresponding to
two possible program outputs o = A and o = B. Each QIF definition uses a different metric to
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name p(name|A)
Firefox 0
Chrome 0
Opera 1
name p(name|B)
Firefox 0.5
Chrome 0.5
Opera 0
Figure 2: A posteriori distribution of names for o=A and o=B.
evaluate how the attacker’s knowledge has changed after running the program and observing an
output.
Smith [25] proposes a metric of vulnerability that is later used in a min-entropy definition of
QIF. Vulnerability V (i|o) computes the maximum probability of identifying the secret i given an
output o1. To evaluate the vulnerability of the program, Smith proposes to compute an average
of all possible outputs:
V (name|A) = max{0, 0, p(Opera|A)} = 1
V (name|B) = max{p(Firefox|B), p(Chrome|B)} = 0.5
V (P) = p(A) · V (name|A) + p(B) · V (name|B)
= 0.02 · 1 + 0.98 · 0.5 = 0.51
Vulnerability V (P) means that on average, given an output, the probability of guessing the secret
after running a program P is 0.51. However, the secret name Opera can be leaked completely by
output A, even though this output has a low probability (p(A) = 0.02). Moreover, the leakage
of exactly this output makes the user uniquely identifiable given there are 50 visitors to the
website. Therefore, approaches that evaluate min-entropy of the program are not suitable for
the enforcement of anonymity.
Clarkson et al. [7] propose a notion of attacker’s belief about possible values of a secret,
represented as an a priori probability distribution (pre-belief). This belief can be revised by
running the program with the actual secret, thus obtaining an a posteriori distribution (post-
belief). Information leakage is defined as a difference in distance between a pre-belief and the
actual secret, and a post-belief and the secret. This definition of leakage is shown to be equivalent
to the self-information of an output corresponding to a secret and is measured in bits. For our
program P, we can compute a leakage separately for Opera browser users (leakage of output A)
and for Chrome and Firefox users (leakage of output B):
I(A) = − log2 p(A) = − log2 0.02 = 5.64 bits
I(B) = − log2 p(B) = − log2 0.98 = 0.03 bits
The goal of these previous works was to evaluate the information learnt about the secret
program input, and was not related to user identifiability. However, since the secret program
input is related to the user identity, the amount of information leaked is also closely related to
the identifiability of the user. For example, Firefox or Chrome user would leak − log2 0.98 bits of
information, in other words, the probability of her browser name is 0.98, which makes her one in
0.98 ∗ 50 = 49 other indistinguishable users. On the contrary, Opera user would leak − log2 0.02
bits, that makes her to be one in 0.02 ∗ 50 = 1 users, therefore such user is uniquely identified.
In our previous work [2], we propose a hybrid monitor that evaluates an amount of information
leaked for each secret input (i.e., for each program execution). The definition of leakage is self-
information, that coincides with Clarkson et al.’s belief-based definition. We could apply a
naive counter-measure against user identification by stopping executions which leak a quantity
1Whenever an output is impossible for a given input, the probability is 0, e.g., p(Firefox|A) = 0
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of information above a given threshold. However, such an approach is not sufficient to enforce
privacy in a presence of a tracker that can observe the absence of output. For example, putting
a threshold of 1 bit would mean that a user should be one in a set of at least 121 ∗ 50 = 25
users. Yet, the naive counter-measure would only stop the execution for Opera users. Therefore,
by observing non-termination, the tracker would identify with certainty Opera users and thus
violate their privacy.
Inspired by the Clarkson et al.’s work on belief revision, Mardziel et al. [20, 21] propose a
definition of knowledge threshold security stating that a program is secure if all the post-beliefs
of all possible secrets are bounded by some threshold t. In case of a fingerprinting program
example, this definition would mean that for all secret names and outputs o: p(name|o) ≤ t
holds. This definition can also be rewritten using the notion of vulnerability: for our program P,
we have
max{V (name|A), V (name|B)} ≤ t.
This definition provides a stronger notion of input secrecy than the definition of vulnerability.
Espinoza and Smith [13] discuss this definition and name it worst-case posterior vulnerability
underlining that it is very biased towards the worst output. Indeed, we would get the same
worst-case posterior vulnerability for a program output name; that always leaks the secret
completely. Nevertheless, this definition provides a very strong guarantee with respect to the
probability that the secret will be guessed after an execution of the program. In order to enforce
threshold based security, Mardziel et al. [20,21] suggest to run the program if the threshold holds
for all the values of the secret input and not to run it in case there is at least one value for
which the guarantee does not hold. This radical approach does not allow all the safe users to
run the program. In our example it would mean that thanks to 1 user of an Opera browser, 49
other website visitors will not execute the program and probably would not get the service they
wanted when they visited the website.
In this paper, we will define a strong definition of privacy based on the worst-case posterior
vulnerability, and adapt it such that it evaluates the probability of guessing the user identity
instead of the probability of guessing the secret program input. For example, given 50 website
visitors, program P will be evaluated to provide a probability of guessing the identity equal to
1 for Opera users and 149 for Firefox and Chrome users. Then, for a threshold t =
1
25 , we will
provide a mechanism that randomizes the browser name for Opera users, and not influence the
experience of Firefox and Chrome users.
1.2 Attacker model and assumptions
We consider terminating (deterministic or probabilistic) programs operating over a finite range of
inputs. Upon termination, the program returns a single value. As we only consider terminating
programs, termination is observable by the attacker and the security property we guarantee is
therefore termination sensitive. In our model, the attacker has arbitrary computing power, he
provides the program and observes the output. The input of the program is secret and represents
a browser configuration. However, the attacker has perfect knowledge over the distribution of
the secret inputs. Our enforcement works by randomising the program inputs, and the attacker
has access to the precise description of the randomisation mechanism.
1.3 Organisation of the paper
In Section 2, we present background information about information theory. We shall be using
an information-theoretic model in which programs as well as user characteristics are modelled
as channels P and U . In Section 3, we explain how fingerprinting protection can be modelled in
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terms of channels. The deterministic channel U models the distribution of the browser statistics
and maps identities to browser configurations. The channel P models the fingerprinting script.
The composition of channels U ⊗P models sequential composition. In Section 4, we explain our
t-privacy guarantee that consists in bounding the worst-case probability P of guessing an identity
based on the observation of a program output.
P(U ⊗ P) ≤ t. (1)
We propose enforcement mechanisms for t-privacy, which are based on lying about your browser
configurations. Formally, enforcement consists in synthesising a channel R such that R ⊗ P is
t-private while optimising the quantity U(R,U) which measures the amount of randomisation of
R w.r.t U .
In Section 5, we show how finding this channel R can be reduced to solving a linear program
where the variables are the entries of the R matrix and the constraints come from the privacy
guarantee, while the objective function models usability i.e., U(R,U). In Section 6, we explore
three kinds of enforcement algorithms derived from this linear programming encoding. A purely
static enforcement would solve the linear program but the complexity of the problem is likely
to make this approach infeasible. Instead we propose to look for locally safe solutions that will
work for individual users but will not solve the global problem optimally. We define the notion
of locally safe and propose a modified algorithm for its enforcement. This algorithm has the
advantage of being decentralised and can furthermore be adapted to be run in an incremental
fashion.
Finally, in Section 7 we consider a generalisation of the enforcement problem in which the
enforcement has to work for all programs, and not just one given program. We show how to
construct a randomised user channel R from a given user channel U , that enforces t-privacy for
any program channel: ∀P : P(R⊗P) ≤ t.
Due to the lack of space, the proofs of the theorems of this paper can be found in the
Appendix.
1.4 Contributions
The main contributions can be summarised as:
• A model of the problem of privacy protection against fingerprinting programs, based on
information-theoretic channels representing the statistics of browser properties and the
program.
• A novel definition of privacy for such systems, that ensures that the probability of an
attacker identifying a user is bounded by a given threshold. We show that the enforce-
ment of privacy can be achieved by randomizing the browser properties, and that this
randomization problem can be reduced to solving linear programs.
• Three algorithms (a purely static, a purely dynamic and an efficient incremental algorithm)
for enforcing privacy against a particular finger-printing program. All algorithms ensure
the strong privacy guarantee, i.e., that the probability of being identified is smaller than a
given threshold. The algorithms optimize the solution with respect to additional “usability”
constraints, which ensure that randomization is used as little as possible.
• A general result about how user privacy can be guaranteed for any program that the
user might run. This represents the worst case scenario, in which a program checks all
the possible browser properties of the user. This result is important in the case where it
Inria
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is difficult or impossible to construct the information-theoretic channel that models the
program (e.g., due to the dynamicity of a language such as JavaScript).
2 Background on information theory
We follow the standard approach and model a system using an information-theoretic channel [8].
In this section we present several most related definitions from this field, such as the probability
of error [5, 6] and vulnerability [25]. We then present a cascade of channels [13] that we use to
model our system and finish the section with several definitions that we will use in our modeling.
A channel is a triple C = (I,O,C), where I and O are finite sets of inputs and outputs, and
C is a channel matrix of size |I| × |O|, where each cell is between 0 and 1, and each row sums
up to 1. Each cell C[i, o] is the probability of getting an output o given an input i, and we also
denote C[i, o] by a conditional probability p(o|i). A channel C is deterministic if each cell of C
is either 0 or 1, meaning that each input can produce only one output.
For a deterministic channel C, we write Im(C, i) for the unique o such that C[i, o] = 1 and
Pre(C, o) for the set of inputs that can produce o:
Im(C, i) = o iff C[i, o] = 1
Pre(C, o) = {i|C[i, o] = 1}.
An input of a channel is a secret information, and the output is observable information. The
set of input values can be considered as a set of mutually exclusive facts, or hypotheses. A
probability distribution p(·) over I is called a priori probability. For a given channel (I,O,C), it
induces a probability distribution over O:
p(o) =
∑
i∈I
p(i, o) =
∑
i∈I
p(o|i) · p(i).
When an output o is observed, the probability that an input has a certain value i is given
by the conditional probability p(i|o), that is called a posterior probability of i given o. The a
posterior probability is usually different from the a priori probability because an observation
o gives some evidence that changes the degree of belief in the hypothesis i. The a posteriori
probability can be computed from the a priori probability using Bayes’ theorem:
p(i|o) =
p(o|i) · p(i)
p(o)
.
Hypothesis testing tries to infer the true hypothesis from the observed fact2. In general, it
is impossible to determine the true hypothesis from just a single observation. Following the
hypothesis testing approach [5], we compute the probability of error, or the probability of making
the wrong guess given the observation o. The probability of error is defined as follows. An
observer’s attempt to guess the secret i given an observation o is expressed as a decision function
f : O → I. The Bayesian framework determines that the best possible decision function fB
is the function that minimises the probability of error in guessing the secret. This function is
obtained by the MAP (Maximum Aposteriori Probability) criterion: it chooses an input i with
maximum p(i|o):
fB(o) = i⇒ ∀i′ : p(i|o) ≥ p(i′|o).
2Usually, an attacker tries to derive the value of a secret input from observing some output o.
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Figure 3: Cascade of channels C0 and C1
The probability of error associated with fB is called the Bayes risk and is given by
P
aver
e = 1−
∑
o∈O
p(o) ·max
i∈I
p(i|o).
We denote the Bayes risk with aver superscript because it evaluates the probability an ob-
server makes an error averaged for all possible channel outputs. Dually, we can compute an
average probability of guessing the secret input given an observation:
P
aver = 1− Pavere =
∑
o∈O
p(o) ·max
i∈I
p(i|o). (2)
The metric of vulnerability introduced by Smith [25] coincides with the definition of the
average probability of guessing. Differently from [5], Smith first introduces a vulnerability of
a distribution as a worst-case probability that an observer would guess the value of a secret
input in one try. After observing an output o, an a posterior distribution has the vulnerability
V (I|o) = maxi∈I p(i|o). Then, Smith proposed to average this probability per each channel
output: V (C) =
∑
o∈O p(o) · V (I|o), thus obtaining the same definition.
In our modeling, we will use a classic construction of a cascade of channels [9], where an
output of one channel is used as an input of another channel as depicted in Fig. 3. The first
applications of a cascade of channels to quantitative information flow were proposed by Köpf
and Smith [18], who evaluated its min-capacity, and the recent work of Espinoza and Smith [13]
redefine a cascade of channels for an arbitrary a priori distribution and show the properties of
vulnerability metric when applied to a cascade of channels.
Definition 1. Two channels C1 = (I, S, C1) and C2 = (S,O,C2) form a cascade of channels
C1 ⊗ C2 = (I,O,C), where
(C1 ⊗ C2)[i, o] =
∑
s∈S
C1[i, s] · C2[s, o].
We now formalise the sets of indistinguishable inputs given a (possibly probabilistic) channel.
The following definition generalises the definition of equivalence classes from [2, 25] to the case
of probabilistic channels. Two secret inputs i and i′ are indistinguishable if the corresponding
rows in the channel matrix are identical.
Definition 2. Given a channel C = (I,O,C), two inputs i and i′ are indistinguishable (written
i ∼C i
′) if for all outputs o, C[i, o] = C[i′, o]. We write EqC(i) = {i′ | i ∼C i′} the set of inputs
indistinguishable from i.
For deterministic channels, the number of sets of indistinguishable secrets is equal to the
number of channel outputs: |O|. However, it is not the case for probabilistic channels (the
channel contains other numbers except for 0 and 1): here the number of sets of indistinguishable
secrets can exceed the number of possible outputs (e.g., consider a case when all the rows of the
matrix are different whatever is the number of outputs).
Inria
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3 Modeling the fingerprinting problem
This section shows how to model fingerprinting in terms of information-theoretic channels. The
input to the script is the browser configuration, that is considered to be the user’s secret. We
model a script as a channel that takes the secret browser configuration s and produces an output
o. Let S be the finite set of all possible configurations, and O the set of all possible outputs of a
script.
In information theory, a program or a script, can be modelled as an information-theoretic
channel (S,O, P ), assuming that the channel operates over a finite set of secrets S and produces
an output from a finite set O. Each matrix element P [s, o] is a conditional probability of an
output o given a secret configuration s. For deterministic scripts, the corresponding channel
can be extracted by running the script for all the possible inputs. These inputs are the possible
browser configurations whose distribution is known to the attacker. For probabilistic scripts,
probabilistic sampling would construct a reliable but approximate channel. Even better, we can
construct an exact channel using symbolic computations over probability distributions. For each
possible input, we can evaluate the script semantics expressed as a distribution transformer [7].
Symmetrically, we can run a weakest pre-expectation calculus [14] which extends weakest pre-
condition calculus to probabilistic programs. The model acquisition problem is out of the scope
of this paper, and henceforth we shall just assume that a channel matrix is given.
Given a channel, we could evaluate the probability of guessing the browser configuration s
given an output o. However, what we are interested in is the probability of guessing the user
identity and not just in knowing her configuration.
The user identities are related to the browser configurations by the browser statistics. These
statistics define how many users have a certain configuration. Assuming that we know which user
possesses which configuration, we can model this relation by a deterministic channel (I, S, U),
where I is a finite set of user identities, S is a finite set of possible browser configurations and U
is a channel matrix, where
U [i, s] =
{
1 if user i has configuration s
0 otherwise.
By construction the matrix U is deterministic, meaning that each row contains only one cell
equal to 1, and the rest are 0s. In other words, U [i, s] means that a user i posseses only one
configuration s. Notice that an a priori distribution of secrets in our system is an a priori
distribution of user identities (both for the user channel U and the cascade of channels U ⊗ P).
Since all the users are initially equally indistinguishable, we assume that the a priori distribution
p(i) is a uniform distribution.
In order to compute the probability of identifying the user with identity i given an observation
o produced by a script running in her browser, we need to combine the channels (I, S, U) and
(S,O, P ). Since the output s of the first channel U is provided as an input to the second channel
P , these channels form a cascade of channels.
4 Threshold-based privacy and usability
In this section we propose our definition of privacy, called t-privacy. It is based on a strong
guarantee that we call probability of guessing the user identity that computes the worst-case
probability of guessing among all possible observations. We explain how and under which condi-
tions t-privacy can be enforced, and propose an additional notion of usability that considers the
user’s requirements and helps to choose the optimal enforcement of t-privacy.
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4.1 Probability of guessing the user identity and t-privacy
In Equation 2 of Section 2, we presented the definition of average probability of guessing the secret
P
aver derived the from Bayes risk [5], this definition coincides with channel’s vulnerability [25].
P
aver represents the fact that an observer will guess the secret in one try averaged for all possible
outputs. However, our goal is to provide a very strong guarantee of privacy, such as “given an
observation, a tracker has a very small probability of guessing the user identity”. Therefore,
we propose a different notion that we call probability of guessing. It computes the worst case
probability of guessing the secret among all possible channel outputs.
Definition 3. The probability of guessing the input of a channel C = (I,O,C) is
P(C) = max
i∈I,o∈O
p(i|o)
and in case of uniform prior distribution,
P(C) = max
i∈I,o∈O
C[i, o]∑
i′ C[i
′, o]
.
Note that this definition is closely related to knowledge threshold security by Mardziel et
al. [20, 21] and worst-case posterior vulnerability by Espinoza and Smith [13].
To model the fingerprinting problem, we use a cascade of channels U ⊗P, where U represents
the users with their configurations and P represents the possibly fingerprinting program. To
protect the user’s privacy, we propose to put a threshold on the probability of guessing the user
identity when a tracker observes the program output. Our definition resembles the definition of
knowledge threshold security [20] , though we use a different motivation. Intuitively, t-privacy
means that every user can be identified with the probability up to t. For example, in the spirit
of k-anonymity, we can express the following policy: “every user must be indistinguishable in a
set of at least k other users”. Our guarantee of t-privacy, where t = 1k , enforces this policy (we
compare t-privacy and k-anonymity in Section 8).
Definition 4 (Threshold-based privacy). A channel C is t-private if the probability of guessing
the channel’s input is bounded by t: P(C) ≤ t.
Using the definition of a cascade of channels, we state the probability of guessing the user
identity after a tracker observes an output of a program execution:
P(U ⊗ P) = max
i∈I,o∈O
∑
s∈S U [i, s] · P [s, o]∑
i′
∑
s∈S U [i
′, s] · P [s, o]
.
Example 2. Consider the program P1 from Example 1: if (name = "Opera") then o := A;
else o := B; output o;. Fig. 4 shows the matrix of a user channel U representing (simplified)
browser statistics and the matrix of a channel P for program P1. When a user with identity
i5 runs the program P, a tracker observes an output A and knows that the user has Opera
configuration. The channel U then makes the user i5 uniquely identifiable, therefore a posteriori
probability is p(i5|A) =
U [i5,Opera]·P [Opera,A]
U [i5,Opera]·P [Opera,A]
= 1. When an attacker observes output B, he concludes
that the user a different configuration than Opera. The channel U makes all the other users
indistinguishable for the attacker thanks to the program output B. Therefore for all these users
p(i|B) = 14 since output B can be obtained from Firefox and Chrome configurations. We conclude
that the probability of guessing the user identity is:
P(U ⊗ P) = max
i∈I,o∈O
p(i|o) = 1.
Inria
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U Firefox Opera
i1 1 0
i2 1 0
i3 1 0
i4 1 0
i5 0 1
P A B
Firefox 0 1
Opera 1 0
Figure 4: User channel and channel for program P1.
We can establish the lower bound on the probability of guessing. The intuition for this bound
is that a channel that best protects the secret input realizes the smallest probability of guessing.
One example is a channel, where all the inputs are mapped into only one output; another example
is a channel, where all the inputs are uniformly distributed between all possible outputs.
Theorem 1. For any channel C = (I,O,C), the probability of guessing the input is bounded:
P(C) ≥ 1|I| .
We compare the probability of guessing the input of the first channel U , and of a cascade
of channels U ⊗ P.3 The program can make some of the secret configurations indistinguishable,
thus making the tracker learn less, and therefore the probability of guessing the user identity
becomes lower. The following theorem is generic for a cascade of two channels and for any prior
distribution.
Theorem 2. The probability of guessing the identity from a user channel U does not increase if
a program channel P is added: P(U ⊗ P) ≤ P(U).
In order to enforce t-privacy, we propose several mechanisms that are based on a substitution
of an original user channel U with a randomized channel R, that defines how exactly each user
should switch to a different configuration. Therefore, t-privacy is enforced if P(R ⊗ P) ≤ t.
However, not every threshold can be enforced by user channel randomization. We state our
enforceability theorem as follows.
Definition 5 (Enforceable threshold). A threshold t is enforceable for a given user channel U
and program channel P if there exists a randomised channel R, such that R ⊗ P is t-private
(P(R⊗P) ≤ t).
Theorem 3 (Enforceability). A threshold t is enforceable for a user channel U = (I, S, U) and
any program channel P if and only if 1|I| ≤ t.
Example 3. Continuing Example 2, a threshold t = 0.5 can be enforced when some Firefox
users switch configurations so that Opera users are less identifiable. The randomized channel R0
in Fig. 5 is using this strategy to enforce t-privacy.
We can graphically represent the space of possible randomization channels R that enforce
t-privacy, where all Firefox users would get a probability x for Firefox and 1−x for Opera, dually
Opera users would get probability y for using Opera and 1 − y for Firefox. The probability of
guessing the user identity of a channel R⊗P is:
max
{
x
4x+ 1− y
,
1− x
4− 4x+ y
,
1− y
4x+ 1− y
,
y
4− 4x+ y
}
.
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R0 Firefox Opera
i1 0.75 0.25
i2 0.75 0.25
i3 0.75 0.25
i4 0.75 0.25
i5 0.7 0.3
p(i1|B) = 0.750.75·4+0.7 = 0.203
p(i5|B) = 0.70.75·4+0.7 = 0.189
p(i1|A) = 0.250.25·4+0.3 = 0.192
p(i5|A) = 0.30.25·4+0.3 = 0.231
Figure 5: For program P, R0 enforces t-privacy with t = 0.5.
Figure 6: Probability of guessing user identity for Example 2 and bound t = 0.5.
In Fig. 6, the dark green surface presents a probability of guessing the user identity of a channel
R⊗P, while the yellow flat surface shows the probability of guessing the identity set to 12 . The
parallelogram at the intersection of two surfaces represents the set of solutions for a randomisation
channel R. The red point x = 0.75, y = 0.3 corresponds to the randomization channel R0 and
belongs to the surface below the threshold t = 12 .
4.2 Usability
It is important to consider usability requirements, such as “the users do not want to switch to
other configurations too often since they prefer to use their original configurations as much as
possible”. We therefore propose a formal definition of usability.
Definition 6 (Usability). Given a channel U , the usability of a channel R is U(R,U) =∑
iR[i, Im(U, i)].
Usability quantifies the amount of switching of configurations incurred by a given channel
R. We aim at maximising usability i.e., minimising the probability that a user needs to switch
between configurations. The maximum theoretical usability is obviously obtained when R = U
and U(U ,U) = |I|.The usability of the channel R0 from Fig. 5 is U(R0,U) = 0.75 · 4+ 0.3 = 3.3.
In the next section we show that there exists another randomised channel R1 that provides
U(R1,U) = 4 for a theoretical optimal of 5.
3Our result resembles Theorem 5 from [13] proving that the min-entropy leakage of the cascade of channels is
not greater than the leakage of the first link in the cascade.
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5 Reduction to Linear Programming
This section shows how to construct a randomised channel R that ensures t-security for the
composed channel R ⊗ P. We parametrize the matrix of the channel R using the variables
R[i, s] = xis, where i ∈ I, s ∈ S and define a system of constraints that such a channel must
satisfy. Finding the best possible channel can then be expressed as a Linear Program.
5.0.1 Channel correctness
The channel matrix R represents conditional probabilities, therefore:
• 0 ≤ xis ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I, s ∈ S, meaning each parameter is a probability.
•
∑
s∈S xis = 1 for all i ∈ I, meaning each row of the matrix represents a distribution.
5.0.2 t-privacy
: the channelRmust guarantee t-privacy for the composed program channel P i.e., P(R⊗P) ≤ t.
Expanding this expression, we get:
max
i∈I,o∈O
∑
s∈S xis · P [s, o]∑
j∈I
∑
s∈S xjs · P [s, o]
≤ t.
This can be rewritten as a system of linear inequalities for all i ∈ I, o ∈ O:∑
s∈S
xis · P [s, o]− t ·
∑
j∈I
∑
s∈S
xjs · P [s, o] ≤ 0.
The system of constraints presented by the channel correctness and t-privacy requirements
have a number of solutions. One solution is a channel R where all the matrix elements are
equal to 1|S| . To see this, observe that 1) the channel is correct :
∑
s∈S
1
|S| = 1; 2) t-privacy is
guaranteed for any P since P(R⊗P) ≤ P(R) (Theorem 2), and P(R) = 1/|S|∑
j∈I
1/|S|
= 1|I| ≤ t for
any enforceable t (Theorem 3). However, this solution might not guarantee the best usability:
it forces each user to use other configurations as often as his original configuration.
This last observation motivates a third requirement:
5.0.3 Usability
Our usability requirement exactly describes the desire of users to switch to other configura-
tions as rarely as possible. Therefore, the usability of a randomised channel R must be max-
imised. Remember that usability U(R,U) =
∑
i∈I R[i, Im(U, i)] represents a sum of all cells in
R where U [i, s] = 1. Therefore, we can rewrite it as a requirement to maximise the function∑
(i∈I):U [i,s]=1 xis.
Combining the requirements presented in this section, we can state our problem as a Linear
Program, where the usability must be maximised while the channel correctness and t-privacy
constraints are satisfied:
max
∑
(i∈I):U [i,s]=1 xis s.t.

0 ≤ xis ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S∑
s∈S xis = 1 ∀i ∈ I∑
s∈S xis · P [s, o]− t·
∑
j∈I
∑
s∈S xjs · P [s, o] ≤ 0
∀i ∈ I, o ∈ O
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U Firefox Opera
i0 1 0
i1 1 0
i2 1 0
i3 1 0
i4 0 1
R Firefox Opera
i0 x00 x01
i1 x10 x11
i2 x20 x21
i3 x30 x31
i4 x40 x41
Figure 7: Original user channel matrix from Ex. 2 and a corresponding randomised channel
matrix.
R1 Firefox Opera
i0 0.9 0.1
i1 0.8 0.2
i2 0.7 0.3
i3 0.6 0.4
i4 0 1
R2 Firefox Opera
i0 1 0
i1 1 0
i2 1 0
i3 0.5 0.5
i4 0.5 0.5
Figure 8: Two optimal solutions for channel R.
Example 4. We present the system of constraints for the program P1 from Example 2. For
a user channel U = (U, I, S), the randomised channel R has a matrix of |I| × |S| parameters
denoted by xis (see Fig. 7). The usability of R is computed as follows:
U(R,U) =
∑
(i∈I):U [i,s]=1
xis = x00+x10+x20+x30+x41.
The constraints imposed by channel correctness are straightforward to write down. Here, we
present the constraints provided by the t- privacy requirement, where the threshold t = 12 :
+ 12 x00−
1
2 x10−
1
2 x20−
1
2 x30−
1
2 x40≤0
− 12 x00+
1
2 x10−
1
2 x20−
1
2 x30−
1
2 x40≤0
. . .
− 12 x01−
1
2 x11−
1
2 x21+
1
2 x31−
1
2 x41≤0
− 12 x01−
1
2 x11−
1
2 x21−
1
2 x31+
1
2 x41≤0
This Linear Program has several solutions. In Fig. 8 we present two optimal solutions R1
and R2.Both solutions are optimal, and U(R1,U) = U(R2,U) = 4.
5.1 Feasibility
In practice, switching to a particular configuration might not be technically feasible. For instance,
faithfully emulating a foreign OS might be considered too drastic a change. Other switchings
of configurations could hinder an optimal user experience. For instance, switching to an arbi-
trary language could have undesirable side-effects. For personal reasons, certain identities might
also wish to keep their configuration unaltered. To model those feasibility constraints, we can
introduce a relation Imp ⊆ I × S representing the configuration switches that are considered
impossible. The fact that those switchings between configurations might be impossible can be
encoded into the Linear Program in a straightforward way. Each pair (i, s) ∈ Imp yields the
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constraint xis = 0. These constraints can be used to pre-process the problem and substitute xis
for 0, thus reducing the number of variables of the problem.
6 Enforcement algorithms
6.1 Static approach
Linear programs can be solved in polynomial time using interior points methods. Despite a
worst-case exponential complexity, the Simplex algorithm is usually superior and practice shows
that, on average, only a linear number of pivot steps are needed. Furthermore, for probabilistic
models, this average linear bound can be formally established [24]. A linear program can be
rewritten in standard form
max c · x s.t.{
A · x ≤ b
x ≥ 0
where A is a n,m-matrix, b and c are vectors of sizem. We write CLP (m,n, s) for the complexity
of solving a linear program withm variables and n constraints where s is the bit-size of the matrix
A i.e.,
s = ‖A‖ =
∑
i,j
⌈log2(|A[i, j]|)⌉.
Under the condition that the matrix P is dense and the threshold t is such that t−1 is integer,
constructing the channel R with optimum utility can be done in complexity CLP (m,n, s) where
m = |I| · |S|
n = |I| · |O|+ |I| · |S|+ |I|
s = |I|2 · ‖P‖+ |I| · ‖P‖+ |I|2 · |O| · |S| · ⌈log2(|t
−1|)⌉
+2 ∗ |I| · |S|.
In the particular case where the channel P is deterministic, we have that ‖P‖ = |S| and therefore
the size of the constaint matrix drops to
s = |I|2 · (|S| · (1 + ⌈log2(|t
−1|)⌉)) + 3 ∗ |I| · |S|.
The complexity is fairly high and solving the linear program directly might not be compu-
tationally feasible. In particular, the complexity is parameterised by the number of identities
|I| and does not exploit properties of the program channel. In the following, we show that it
is possible to substantially reduce the number of parameters needed to construct an optimal
channel R.
6.2 Indistinguishable identities
Theorem 4. Suppose that channels U , P and R are such that
• identities i1 and i2 are indistinguishable (i1 ∼U i2);
• the channel R⊗P is t-private.
Then there exists a channel R′ such that
• the rows of index i1 and i2 of R
′ are identical;
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R′ Firefox Opera
i0 x 1− x
i1 x 1− x
i2 x 1− x
i3 x 1− x
i4 1− y y
max 4x+ y s.t.

x− 12 · (4x+ 1− y) ≤ 0
1− x− 12 · (4− 4x+ y) ≤ 0
1− y − 12 · (4x+ 1− y) ≤ 0
y − 12 · (4− 4x+ y) ≤ 0
x ≥ 0 y ≥ 0
Figure 9: Randomized channel and a linear program after adding equality constraints on indis-
tinguishable identities.
• the channel R′ ⊗ P is also t-private;
• and the usability of R′ is the same as the usability of R : U(R,U) = U(R′,U).
The corollary of Theorem 4 is that the linear program can be strengthened by adding equality
constraints between variables. More precisely, for any pair of indistinguishable identities4 i and
i′, we can add the additional constraints
xis = xi′s ∀s ∈ S.
The whole system of constraints can therefore be rewritten by replacing each variable xis by the
variable xi′s where i′ is the representative of the set EqU (i). This transformation has a drastic
impact on the size of the resulting linear program which becomes independent from the number
of identities. The number of variables is |S| · |S| instead of |I| · |S| and the number of constraints
is |S| · |O|+ |S| · |S|+ |S| instead of |I| · |O|+ |I| · |S|+ |I|.
Example 5. To demonstrate the significant simplification of the problem, in Fig. 9 we present
the randomized channel R′ and the linear program for Ex. 4, where all the indistinguishable
identities get the same enforcement. One optimal solution of this problem is x = 0.9, y = 0.4,
another optimal solution is x = 0.8, y = 0.8. We show these two solutions in Fig. 6 in blue color.
6.3 Greedy algorithm
We can exploit the structure of the program and reduce further the complexity at the cost of
a potential non-optimal utility. In particular, we can detect identities i whose probability of
guessing is below the threshold with the original channel U . Definition 7 captures this notion.
Definition 7. Given a channel P and a channel U , an identity i is locally safe iff
1
|EqU⊗P(i)|
≤ t.
In other words, the probability of guessing of locally safe identities is below the threshold t
whatever the mapping of other identities.
Theorem 5. Let Safe be the locally safe identities for P w.r.t. U . Then there is a channel R
such that P(R⊗P) ≤ t and ∀i ∈ Safe : R[i, Im(U, i)] = 1.
4Definition 2 presents indistinguishable program inputs and a representative set EqU (i).
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Proof. Given an identity i0 ∈ Safe, the channel R can be constructed as follows:
∀i ∈ Safe, R[i, j] =
{
1 if j = Im(U, i)
0 if j 6= Im(U, i)
∀i 6∈ Safe, R[i, j] =
{
1 if j = Im(U, i0)
0 if j 6= Im(U, i0).
All locally safe identities i ∈ Safe are unmodified and therefore their probability of guessing is
below the threshold t. All the other identities i /∈ Safe are modified so that they are undistin-
guishable from the safe identity i0 and therefore their probability of guessing is also below the
threshold t.
Using Theorem 5, we can devise a greedy algorithm for solving the linear program. Identifying
the locally safe identities can be done by performing the channel composition U⊗P and counting
the number of identical lines. Because the channel U is deterministic, channel composition can be
performed in quadratic time. Sorting the resulting |S| lines of the resulting channel and counting
the number of identical lines can be done in O(|O| · |S| · log(S)). For each safe identity, i, the
algorithm would assign all the variables xij such that
xij =
{
1 if j = Im(U, i)
0 otherwise
.
The remaining constraints can be solved using standard linear programming algorithms. The
size of the LP has been further reduced: there are |S| · (|S|− |Safe|) variables and (1+ |S|) · (|S|−
|Safe|)+ |S| · |O| constraints. This is a substantial gain: the number of variables is decreasing as
a linear function of |Safe|. Moreover, even if the remaining constraints do not completely vanish,
they are sparser.
This algorithm is maximising usability locally because locally safe identities are not modified.
However, there is no guarantee that this strategy would provide the maximum usability.
Example 6. Consider a threshold t = 12 and the enforcement of
1
2 -privacy for the channels U
and P of Fig. 10. Note that identities i1 and i2 are indistinguishable. As the threshold is 12 , i1
and i2 are locally safe
EqU⊗P(i1) = EqU⊗P(i2) = {i1, i2}.
As a result, the greedy algorithm is solving the following parameterised R channel:
R Firefox Opera Chrome
i1 1 0 0
i2 1 0 0
i3 x20 x21 x22
i4 x30 x31 x32
An optimal solution with U(R,U) = 3 is obtained with
x20 = x30 = 0 x21 = x22 = x30 = x31 = x32 = 12 .
Here, the identities i1 and i2 keep their secrets while i3 and i4 are uniformly randomised over
Opera and Chrome.
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U Firefox Opera Chrome
i1 1 0 0
i2 1 0 0
i3 0 1 0
i4 0 0 1
P A B C
Firefox 1 0 0
Opera 0 1 0
Chrome 0 0 1
Figure 10: User channel and channel for program if name = "Firefox" then o := A else
{if name = "Opera" then o := B else o := C}.
6.4 Decentralised algorithm
The previous algorithm can be modified to work in a completely decentralised fashion where
each row of the channel R can be computed independently. If an identity i is locally safe, we get
R[i, j] =
{
1 if j = Im(U, i)
0 otherwise
.
Otherwise, if an identity i′ is not locally safe, it needs to switch configuration. This can be
done by identifying an identity that is locally safe. If there is none, the identity i maximising
|EqU⊗P(i)| can be chosen and therefore the identities are all indistinguishable.
Example 7. Continuing with the channels of Fig. 10, the decentralised algorithm also allows
identities i1 and i2 to keep their secrets unchanged. However, i3 and i4 would switch to the safe
identity i1. Compared to the greedy algorithm, the decentralised algorithm obtains a smaller
usability : U(R,U) = 2.
For deterministic programs, a quantitative information flow dynamic (or hybrid) monitor
e.g., [2] can evaluate if the knowledge contained in a program result is below the threshold.
Using the decentralised algorithm, if the quantity of information is below the threshold, it is
safe to output the result. If the identity is not proved locally safe by the dynamic monitor, the
identity i maximising |EqU⊗P(i)| can be obtained using the previous algorithm. This identity
i should be used instead of the original user identity. Note that returning a result ⊥ distinct
from existing outputs i.e., an observable termination of the program does not achieve the same
privacy guarantee. In practice, we can expect that there are many locally safe configurations
and they can be identified for instance by enumerating identities by decreasing popularity and
for instance running an hybrid monitor.
Using this scheme, the usability might not be optimal. Yet, the computation is decentralised
and the overhead can be small for identity for which local safety can be established by hybrid
monitoring.
6.5 Incremental approach
The previous approaches might require too much computing power or lack usability. An interest-
ing trade-off can be obtained by solving the linear program incrementally. In this scenario, each
time an identity i intends to run a program P , it queries a central entity to get its (randomised)
secret configuration. The central entity updates the current channel R based on these requests.
Initially, the central entity can consider the uniformly random channel5. For each request from an
identity i, the central entity can trigger a partial optimisation specific to the secret configuration
s of i. In terms of the linear program, it consists in only optimising the line of R corresponding to
5This channel is either t-private or none is (see Theorem 3).
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the secret configuration of i. Hence, the resulting linear program has only |S| variables and can
solved more efficiently. Each optimisation step necessarily improves the global usability but also
the usability of i. The optimisation has also a fairness property: the optimisation is biased based
of the frequency of the secret configurations. However, as illustrated by the following example,
the global optimal usability is not guaranteed. Moreover, upon convergence, the utility depends
on the order of the optimisation steps.
Example 8. Consider the channels U and P of Fig. 10 and the uniformly random matrix R
(R[i, j] = 13 for all i, j). The initial usability is U(R,U) = 1.
After a request from i1, the local optimisation for the secret Firefox yields an improved
usability U(R,U) = 83 and i1 does not need to be randomised
R[i1, Firefox] = 1.
Moreover, as i1 and i2 are indistinguishable, they get the same enforcement and therefore
R[i2, F irefox] = 1. In this configuration, neither i3 nor i4 can be locally optimised.
If the first optimisation request is from i3, the local optimisation for the secret "Opera" yields
an improved U(R,U) = 2 and i3 does not need to be randomised
R[i3, Opera] = 1.
In this configuration, neither i1 nor i2 can be optimised. Yet, the usability for i4 can still be
optimised. We obtain:
R[i4] = [0;
1
3
;
2
3
]
and an improved U(R,U) = 73 . In this configuration, none of the identity can be locally optimised.
6.6 Summary of algorithms
In this part, we have presented several algorithms for synthesising a channel R such that R⊗P
is t-private. All the algorithms are based on solving the Linear Program whose optimal solution
yields the R channel with maximum usability U(R,U). We proved in Section 6.2 that there
always exist an optimal solution such that indistinguishable identities (i ≃U i′) have the same
enforcement i.e., R[i] = R[i′]. We exploit this property to simplify the LP formulation and
reduce the number of variables from |I| · |S| to |S| · |S|.
The traditional linear programming algorithm was then refined into a series of more spe-
cialised algorithms. The greedy algorithm (Section 6.3) exploit further indistinguishability and
ensures that identities which probability of guessing is below the threshold t do not need to
switch their configuration. Computing this probability of guessing is much cheaper than solving
the full Linear Program. However, the usability of the final channel R might not be optimal. In
Section 6.4, we propose a decentralised algorithm allowing identities to make their enforcement
decision in a decentralised manner. This is a refinement of the greedy algorithm where identities
whose probability of guessing is above the threshold t can switch to an arbitrary configuration
as soon as its probability of guessing is below the threshold. From the implementation point of
view, the advantage is that each enforcement decision is made locally and the enforcement is
transparent for identities whose probability of guessing is below the threshold. However, other
identities need to systematically switch configuration, thus limiting usability. The last approach
(Section 6.5) is centralised but based on an incremental optimisation biased towards the dis-
tribution of configurations. The enforcement is optimised on a per-configuration basis, and the
usability increases as more configurations are considered. Therefore, at each optimisation step,
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the linear program has |S| free variables instead of |S| · |S|. Moreover, as opposed to the decen-
tralised algorithm, identities whose probability of guessing is above the threshold do not need to
systematically switch configuration. Compared to the greedy algorithm, identities whose proba-
bility of guessing is below the threshold migth be required to switch configurations in order to
optimise usability.
7 Enforcing t-privacy for any program
In this section we consider a case when the program channel P is unknown or cannot be computed.
In this case, only the user channel U = (I, S, U) is given, and we need to ensure that for any
program P, the probability of identifying the user is bounded by t.
7.1 Randomisation of channel U with uniform distribution
To provide a generic solution for any user channel, we first propose a randomization for a user
channel that models a uniform distribution of the user identities w.r.t. their configurations.
We denote this channel by UId = (I, S, UId), where UId is an identity matrix. Like in previous
sections, we find a randomised channel RId = (I, I, RId) s.t. t-privacy is enforced while usability
is maximised by solving a (simplified) linear program. Notice that the threshold t must be
enforceable for a channel UId in a sense of Theorem 3.
max
∑
xii s.t.

0 ≤ xij ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈ I∑
j∈I xij = 1 ∀i ∈ I
xik − t ·
∑
j∈I xjk ≤ 0 ∀i, k ∈ I
We find the following solution to this problem:
RId [i, j] =
{
t if i = j
1−t
|I|−1 otherwise
with the probability of guessing: P(RId) = t and the usability: U(RId ,UId) = t·|I|. Interestingly,
usability depends on a threshold: the higher is the threshold t, the bigger is the probability that
the user can be identified, the less his original configuration should change, and hence the more
usability would be provided.
7.2 Randomisation of an arbitrary channel U
We now construct a randomised user channel R from a given user channel U , that satisfies the
t-privacy for any program channel P: ∀P : P(R ⊗ P) ≤ t. Like before, a threshold t must be
enforceable in a sense of Theorem 3.
We build a channel R by starting from a channel RId and merging the columns of the
identities that share the same configuration in the user channel U .
R[i, s] =
{
t+ 1−t|I|−1 · (ns − 1) if i ∈ Pre(U, s)
1−t
|I|−1 · ns otherwise
(3)
where ns = |Pre(U, s)|. We now prove the main properties of the constructed channel R.
Lemma 1 (Well-formedness). Given a user channel U = (I, S, U), a randomized channel R =
(I, S,R), where R is computed by equation (3) is well-formed:
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• 0 ≤ R[i, s] ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I, s ∈ S, meaning each parameter is a probability
•
∑
s∈S R[i, s] = 1 for all i ∈ I, meaning each line in matrix represents a distribution
Lemma 2 (t-privacy). Given a user channel U , the randomised channel R, where R is computed
by equation (3) for an enforceable threshold t, is t-private:
P(R) ≤ t.
We can now prove the main theorem of this section: a constructed randomized user channel
R can ensure t-privacy for any program channel P.
Theorem 6. For any user channel U = (I, S, U), the randomised user channel R = A(U)
ensures t-security for any program channel P = (S,O, P ):
∀P : P(R⊗P) ≤ t
We do not prove that the randomised user channel R provides an optimal usability. The
usability of a solution R given a user channel U is:
U(R,U) =
∑
s∈S
|Pre(U, s)| · (t+
1− t
|I| − 1
· (|Pre(U, s)| − 1)).
We now state the lower and upper bounds of the usability that is defined by the characteristics
of the channel U :
U(R,U) ≥ l · |S| · (t+
1− t
|I| − 1
· (l − 1)) ≥ t · |I|
U(R,U) ≤ h · |S| · (t+
1− t
|I| − 1
· (h− 1)) ≤ |I|
where l = mins∈S Pre(U, s) and h = maxs∈S Pre(U, s).
In a general case, the randomized user channel R constructed in this section, will provide a
solution with a reduced usability with respect to the solutions provided by other approaches in
a previous section. The reason for this is the fact that a program channel P may already make
some of the configurations indistinguishable thus the users of such configurations could obtain a
better usability.
8 Related work and Discussion
8.1 Evaluation of information flow
Mardziel et al. [20, 21] define the notion of threshold secure program. This is a generalisation
of t-privacy allowing to attach different thresholds to different secrets. In our context, as we
wish to protect privacy (and not secrets), only a single threshold is needed. Mardziel et al.
are using an abstract domain of probabilistic polyhedra for computing an over-approximation
of the threshold security of a program. They exploit this information to implement a simple
enforcement algorithm: If the program is threshold secure, it runs without modification; if it is
not threshold secure, it does not run at all. Our enforcement offers a better usability at the price
of randomising the program inputs. Yet, our enforcement algorithms can ensure a minimum
randomisation that is thus affecting a minimal set of users. For example, a greedy algorithm
ensures that locally safe users will always run the program without any changes.
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Klebanov [15,16] has proposed efficient algorithms for exactly computing standard quantita-
tive information flow measures of programs such as conditional (minimal) guessing entropy. The
algorithms are either based on SAT-solving techniques [16] or on extended Barvinok counting [27].
These techniques are applied only to restricted classes of programs. SAT-based techniques re-
quire a propositional encoding of programs. Extended Barvinok counting consists in computing
the number of integer points in a parametrised polyhedron and thus applies to programs that
can be specified using linear integer arithmetic. In our theoretical setting, channels can model
arbitrary terminating programs with a finite input/output relation but constructing explicitly
the channel matrix could be costly. More efficient enforcement algorithms could certainly benefit
from syntactic program restrictions. For deterministic programs, Klebanov’s approaches can be
adapted for deciding whether a program is t-private. Notice that Klebanov is only concerned
with the problem of quantifying information flows and does not consider enforcement. However,
this information can be directly exploited to implement the simple enforcement proposed by
Mardziel et al..
Köpf and Rybalchenko [17] approximate the entropy of a program using a combination of
static and dynamic analyses, where random sampling is enhanced by a symbolic backward anal-
ysis. The method ensures a rapid convergence rate but the guarantee is probabilistic. Because
t-privacy is a property quantifying over all the program inputs, it cannot be established by ran-
dom sampling. Moreover, the purpose of t-privacy is to protect all users (especially those whose
configurations are rare).
8.2 Database privacy definitions
8.2.1 k-anonymity
Sweeney [26] proposes k-anonymity, a security property of anonymization services that requires
that every individual is anonymous within some set of at least size k. k-anonymity was not widely
adopted as a privacy definition for two major reasons: 1) the values of sensitive attributes in
the remaining set could be discovered due to their little diversity; 2) attackers with background
knowledge of the distribution of the secret inputs can still infer some information about the
secrets despite the fact that k-anonymity is enforced.
The first problem related to k-anonymity is shown by an example when a program’s output
could have been caused by one of k possible inputs, but one of those inputs is much more probable
than the rest. After observing a k-anonymous answer of a query, the post distribution of the
secrets represents this knowledge of the attacker. The probability of guessing the secret given this
knowledge is bounded by t thanks to t-privacy guarantee. The second problem is not applicable
in our case since the attacker does not have any background knowledge: he collects all the data
about the user through the execution of the program, and he has no history of interaction with
the user because he cannot identify the user.
To propose the solution to the above-mentioned issues related to the definition of k-anonymity,
Machanavajjhala et al. [19] proposed a notion of l-diversity to specify that the remaining sensitive
data must be diverse. This definition does not apply to our case.
8.2.2 Differential privacy
Dwork et al. [10] proposed a new privacy definition: a query to the database is ǫ-differentially
private if and only if its answer is very similar to this query answer over a database that differs
in only one record. In the other words, one record in a database does not significantly change
the answer of a query. Differential privacy was designed to reason about databases, while our
probability of guessing is defined over guessing the only one secret: the user identity. Mardziel
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et al., [21] make the observation that threshold based privacy and differential privacy can by
formally compared using the notion of ǫ-adversarial privacy [23]. This notion was proven to be
equivalent to differential privacy for a certain class of attacker’s a priori distribution of input
secrets (uniform distribution in our case). In our notations ǫ-adversarial privacy can be defined
as follows.
Definition 8. A channel C = (C, I,O) is ǫ-adversarially private iff for all input secrets i ∈ I
and for all output o ∈ O we have p(i|o) ≤ eǫp(i).
As we consider only one a priori distribution of secrets, ǫ-adversarial privacy definition coin-
cides with our definition of t-privacy where t = e
ǫ
|I| . Because differential privacy protects against
a class of attacker’s the security guarantee is formally stronger. For this reason, algorithms for
differential privacy [11] would therefore randomise scripts that are already t-private (but not
ǫ-adversarial private) thus reducing their usability. In our fingerprinting context, we exploit the
attacker’s a priori knowledge for synthesising a channel that is t-private with minimal randomi-
sation.
9 Conclusions and further work
Web tracking uses browser fingerprinting to identify users via scripts that obtain information
about the browser’s configuration. To protect users from such tracking, we propose a privacy
enforcement mechanism based on randomisation of the script input. We have formalized this
idea through the notion of t-privacy which guarantees that the probability of guessing an identity
by observing a script output is below a threshold t. We have presented a series of algorithms
for enforcing t-privacy, all based on a Linear Programming formulation of the problem. The
algorithms provide various trade-off between efficiency and usability where usability means that as
little randomization as possible is used. The exact resolution of the LP provides optimal usability.
We also provide an enforcement mechanism ensuring the t-privacy of arbitrary programs at the
cost of a reduced usability.
In our model, both the attacker and the enforcement mechanism have perfect knowledge
of the channel U i.e., a perfect knowledge of the distribution of the configurations. In a fin-
gerprinting context, there are databases providing detailed information about the statistics of
browser configurations [12] but a perfect, real-time knowledge of the distribution of the browser
configuration worldwide is not realistic. As future work, we will investigate how to extend our
framework to model partial knowledge e.g., the fact that the user channel U belongs to a set U.
One extension could e.g., consist in synthesising a channel R that would ensure t-privacy
respect to the set U. If U is expressed as a parameterised distribution, the enforcement problem
can be stated as a non-linear optimisation problem instead of a Linear Program. Another exten-
sion consists in considering that the attacker might have an imprecise pre-belief [7] (U ∈ U) and
ensure, for instance, that the channel is t-private with high probability. We could also consider
that the attacker does not know the precise R channel but only the properties it enforces. In
that case, the enforcement could ensure t-privacy at a better usability.
A longer-term extension of our model consists in modelling the dynamics of browser con-
figurations. This dynamics is an obstacle to fingerprinting as fingerprints need to be resist the
modification of configurations. In theory, this should allow to design enforcement mechanisms
providing a better usability. One of the author has started a preliminary practical evaluation of
the evolution of fingerprints [3]. However, more research is needed to incorporate this knowledge
into a formal model.
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The appendix contains the proofs for the theorems of the paper.
Theorem 1. For any channel C = (I,O,C), the probability of guessing the input is bounded:
P(C) ≥ 1|I| .
Proof. Following the definition of probability of guessing, P(C) = maxi∈I,o∈O p(i|o). Let’s denote
an output o′ that maximizes the probability p(i|o), so that
P(C) = max
i∈I
p(i|o′)
Given such output o′, p(i|o′) forms a posterior distribution, and therefore
∑
i∈I p(i|o
′) = 1.
Hence, one of the two statements hold:
• either ∀i ∈ I : p(i|o′) = 1|I| , hence P(C) =
1
|I| ,
• or ∃i ∈ I : p(i|o′) > 1|I| , hence P(C) >
1
|I| .
Theorem 2. The probability of guessing the identity from a user channel U does not increase if
a program channel P is added: P(U ⊗ P) ≤ P(U).
Proof. Given a user channel U = (I, S, U), a program channel P = (S,O, P ), and a cascade
of channels U ⊗ P = (I,O, p(o|i)), let us rewrite the definition of probability of guessing as a
maximum probability of an a posteriori distribution:
max
i∈I,o∈O
p(i|o) ≤ max
i∈I,s∈S
p(i|s). (4)
We rewrite the definition of the probability p(i|o):
p(i|o) =
p(i, o)
p(o)
=
p(o|i) · p(i)
p(o)
=
∑
s∈S p(i) · U [i, s] · P [s, o]∑
j∈I
∑
s∈S p(j) · U [j, s] · P [s, o]
=
∑
s∈S p(i) · p(s|i) · P [s, o]∑
s∈S
∑
j∈I p(j) · p(s|j) · P [s, o]
=
∑
s∈S p(i, s) · P [s, o]∑
s∈S p(s) · P [s, o]
=
∑
s∈S p(s) · p(i|s) · P [s, o]∑
s∈S p(s) · P [s, o]
For readability by f(s, o) we denote p(s) · P [s, o]. To prove the statement (4), we have to
prove that ∀i, o : p(i|o) ≤ p(i′, s′) where i′ and s′ maximize p(i|s). Therefore, we need to prove
that for all i, o: ∑
s∈S p(i|s) · f(s, o)∑
s∈S f(s, o)
≤ p(i′|s′)
which holds since p(i, s) ≤ p(i′, s′) for all i, s.
Theorem 3 (Enforceability). A threshold t is enforceable for a user channel U = (I, S, U) and
any program channel P if and only if 1|I| ≤ t.
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Proof. It-direction: If t is enforceable for U and P, then according to Definition 5, there exists
a randomized channel R, such that P(R ⊗ P) ≤ t. Given that R ⊗ P has the same number of
inputs |I| as U , and following Theorem 1, we have t ≥ P(R⊗P) ≥ 1|I| .
Only-if direction: There exists a fully randomized channel R = (I, S,R), where R[i, s] = 1|S|
for all i, s. By construction,
P(R) = max
i,s
R[i, s]∑
j∈I R[j, s]
=
1
|S|
|I| · 1|S|
=
1
|I|
.
Following Theorem 2 and using the only-if condition stating t ≥ 1|I| , we have:
P(R⊗P) ≤ P(R) =
1
|I|
≤ t.
Therefore, t is enforceable for a user channel U = (I, S, U) and any program channel P.
Theorem 4. Suppose that channels U , P and R are such that
• identities i1 and i2 are indistinguishable (i1 ∼U i2);
• the channel R⊗P is t-private.
Then there exists a channel R′ such that
• the rows of index i1 and i2 of R
′ are identical;
• the channel R′ ⊗ P is also t-private;
• and the usability of R′ is the same as the usability of R : U(R,U) = U(R′,U).
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider that i1 and i2 are the first two rows of R (i.e.,
R = [R[i1];R[i2];R|I\{i1,i2}]) and that Im(R, i1) = Im(R, i2) = s1 for some s1. The channel R
′
can be constructed from R by averaging the rows for i1 and i2. Let a = 12 (R[i1] +R[i2]), we
have
R′ = [a; a;R|I\{i1,i2}]
We have R′[i1] = R′[i2] = a and the rows are therfore identical. We have U(R′,U) = (U(R,U)−
R[i1, s]−R[i2, s])+2×a[s]. As a[s] = 12 (R[i1, s1] +R[i2, s1]), the usability is therefore unchanged.
To prove that the channel R′ ⊗ P is also t-private, it remains to prove (for all i and o) that
∑
s∈S
R′[i, s] · P [s, o]− t ·
∑
j∈I
∑
s∈S
R′[j, s] · P [s, o] ≤ 0
By definition of R′ and the fact that R′[i1, s] + R′[i2, s] = 2 ∗ a[s] = R[i1, s] + R[i2, s], the
constraint is equivalent to∑
s∈S
R′[i, s] · P [s, o]− t ·
∑
j∈I
∑
s∈S
R[j, s] · P [s, o] ≤ 0
If i /∈ {i1; i2}, we have
∑
s∈S R
′[i, s] · P [s, o] =
∑
s∈S R[i, s] · P [s, o] and the constraint holds
because R ⊗ P is t-private. If i = i1, i2, we have
∑
s∈S R
′[i, s] · P [s, o] =
∑
s∈S
1
2 (R[i1, s] +
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R[i2, s]) ·P [s, o]. W.l.o.g., suppose that
∑
s∈S R[i1, s] ·P [s, o] ≤
∑
s∈S R[i2, s] ·P [s, o]. It follows
that
∑
s∈S R
′[i, s] · P [s, o] ≤
∑
s∈S R[i2, s] · P [s, o] and we conclude∑
s∈S R
′[i, s] · P [s, o]− t ·
∑
j∈I
∑
s∈S R[j, s] · P [s, o] ≤∑
s∈S R[i2, s] · P [s, o]− t ·
∑
j∈I
∑
s∈S R[j, s] · P [s, o] ≤ 0
Hence, the constraints hold. The channel R′ ⊗ P is therefore t-private and this concludes the
proof.
Theorem 5. Let Safe be the locally safe identities for P w.r.t. U . Then there is a channel R
such that P(R⊗P) ≤ t and ∀i ∈ Safe : R[i, Im(U, i)] = 1.
Proof. Given an identity i0 ∈ Safe, the channel R can be constructed as follows:
∀i ∈ Safe, R[i, j] =
{
1 if j = Im(U, i)
0 if j 6= Im(U, i)
∀i 6∈ Safe, R[i, j] =
{
1 if j = Im(U, i0)
0 if j 6= Im(U, i0)
All locally safe identities i ∈ Safe are unmodified and therefore their probability of guessing is
below the threshold t. All the other identities i /∈ Safe are modified so that they are undistin-
guishable from the safe identity i0 and therefore their probability of guessing is also below the
threshold t.
Lemma 1 (Well-formedness). Given a user channel U = (I, S, U), a randomized channel R =
(I, S,R), where R is computed by equation (3) is well-formed:
• 0 ≤ R[i, s] ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I, s ∈ S, meaning each parameter is a probability
•
∑
s∈S R[i, s] = 1 for all i ∈ I, meaning each line in matrix represents a distribution
Proof. For simplicity of reading, by N we denote |I|. Proving 0 ≤ R[i, s] ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I, s ∈ S:
• If i ∈ Pre(U, s) then
R[i, s] = t+
1− t
N − 1
· (|Pre(U, s)| − 1).
Given that 1 ≤ |Pre(U, s)| ≤ N , we have:
0 < t ≤ R[i, s] ≤ t+ 1− t = 1.
• If i /∈ Pre(U, s) then
R[i, s] =
1− t
N − 1
· |Pre(U, s)|.
Given that 1 ≤ |Pre(U, s)| ≤ N − 1, we have:
0 <
1− t
N − 1
≤ R[i, s] ≤ 1− t < 1.
Proving
∑
s∈S R[i, s] = 1 for all i ∈ I. Let’s take an arbitrary row i of a matrix R and split
all the secrets s in two sums: s ∈ Im(U, i) and s /∈ Im(U, i). Since U is a deterministic channel,
for every user i there is only one s such that U [i, s] = 1, and therefore |Im(U, i)| = 1. For our
row i, let’s denote this single secret by s0. Notice that s ∈ Im(U, i) means that i ∈ Pre(U, s).
Hence,
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∑
s∈S R[i, s] =
∑
s∈Im(U,i) t+
1−t
N−1 · (|Pre(U, s)| − 1)
+
∑
s/∈Im(U,i)
1−t
N−1 · |Pre(U, s)|
= t+ 1−tN−1 · |Pre(U, s0)| −
1−t
N−1
+
∑
s∈S\{s0}
1−t
N−1 · |Pre(U, s)|
= t− 1−tN−1 +
1−t
N−1 ·
∑
s∈S |Pre(U, s)|
= t− 1−tN−1 +
1−t
N−1 ·N = t+ 1− t = 1
Lemma 2 (t-privacy). Given a user channel U , the randomised channel R, where R is computed
by equation (3) for an enforceable threshold t, is t-private:
P(R) ≤ t.
Proof. The probability of guessing the input of a channel R is:
P(R) = max
i∈I,s∈S
R[i, s]∑
i′∈I R[i
′, s]
.
To prove the lemma, let us prove that for any fixed i and s:
R[i, s] ≤ t ·
∑
i′∈I
R[i′, s].
We first compute the sum on the right-hand side for s fixed s (here ns = |Pre(U, s)|):
∑
i′∈I R[i
′, s] =
∑
i∈Pre(U,s)(t+
1−t
N−1 · (ns − 1))
+
∑
i/∈Pre(U,s)
1−t
N−1 · ns
= (t+ 1−tN−1 · (ns − 1)) · ns
+ 1−tN−1 · ns · (N − ns)
= nsN−1 (t ·N − t+ ns − 1− t · ns + t
+N − ns − t ·N + t · ns)
= nsN−1 · (N − 1) = ns
There are two cases for a given fixed i:
• If i ∈ Pre(U, s), then R[i, s] = t+ 1−tN−1 ·(ns−1). We now prove that R[i, s]−t·
∑
i′∈I R[i
′, s] ≤
0, we rewrite it as:
t+ 1−tN−1 · (ns − 1)− t · ns
= t+ 1−tN−1 · (ns − 1)− t · (ns − 1)− t
=
∑ns−1
k=1 (
1−t
N−1 − t) ≤ 0
because each element of the sum 1−tN−1 − t ≤ 0 since t ≥
1
N according to Theorem 3 on the
enforceability of t.
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• If i /∈ Pre(U, s), then given that t is enforceable and according to Theorem 3, t ≥ 1N , we
have 1−tN−1 ≤ t, and therefore
1−t
N−1 · ns ≤ t · ns, meaning that R[i, s] ≤ t ·
∑
i′∈I R[i
′, s].
Theorem 6. For any user channel U = (I, S, U), the randomised user channel R = A(U)
ensures t-security for any program channel P = (S,O, P ):
∀P : P(R⊗P) ≤ t
Proof. By Theorem 2, we have
∀P : P(R⊗P) ≤ P(R)
and according to Lemma 2: P(R) ≤ t.
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